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Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325794
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the player set is partitioned into unions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205
connected with sellers only, we show that Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value …. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326342
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326357
-known efficiency axiom. Further, we show that another axiomatization of the Shapley value is obtained if we replace t he second axiom … and efficiency by the axiom which applies the efficiency condition to every class of indifferent players. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326379
We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326385
Hamiache (2001) assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value is characterized as the unique solution for TU games satisfying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. The latter notion means that for every game the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326456
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326524
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328345
A group of agents are waiting for their job to be processed in a facility. We assume that each agent needs the same amount of processing time and incurs waiting costs. The facility has two parallel servers, being able to serve two agents at a time. We are interested in finding the order to serve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332214