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INFORMATION AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE.

VIVES, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823867

Learning from Others.

Vives, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823905

Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.

Obiols, C.P. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823910

Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition.

Burguet, R.; Vives, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

This paper studies the incentives of short-lived agents to acquire costly private information in the presence of public … signals arising from market interaction. It characterizes the social learning process, that is the revelation of information … by public signals, and the information externalities involved. The analysis provides insights on the scope for government …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823911

Competition for Managers and Market Efficiency.

Barros, F.; Macho-Stadler, M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823928

SECURITY RETRADING ON NEW INFORMATION IN INCOMPLETE MARKET.

CHAE, S. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823943

Market Versus Limit Orders.

Caballe, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823958

A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition.

Rocher, F.; Vila, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

The model we discuss in this note is a re-examination of the classical Bertrand model of imperfect competition. the main difference is that consumers are allowed to have some strategic behavior when deciding from which one of the two sellers to buy. We will approach the resolution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823960

Tight Cyclic Game Forms.

Gurvich, V.A.; Golberg, A.I. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823972

The Informational Value of Incumbency

Carmen Bevi?; Llavador, Humberto - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with- out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters informa- ion about governing politicians not available from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823973