We build a general equilibrium model of bank competition in which securitization is the banks�optimal choice. A symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand competition equilibrium exists as in the directed search literature, e.g., Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). A key feature of the model is that...

Abstract Following their EU15 counterparts, the banking systems of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries underwent extensive reform since the 1990s. In this paper we estimate the degree of bank market power during the periods of financial reform in each European country, and subsequently...

Many studies have analysed the effect of financial development and bank competition on economic growth from a cross-country perspective. However, to our knowledge, no paper has analysed the effect of these two financial variables on growth at regional level. This paper examines the case of the...

This paper analyzes the effect of regional financial development and bank competition on firms’ growth using the Spanish provinces as a testing ground. Our results show that firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grow faster in more financially developed provinces....

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of financial development and banking competition on economic growth using both structural measures of competition (market concentration) and measures based on the new empirical industrial organization perspective (Panzar and Rosse`s test and the...

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby,...

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this...

The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized credit contract) and explicitly capture the impact of...

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project’s risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank’s choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not...

This paper examines how bank competition affects the amount of credit provided to small businesses using both the loan turndown rate and the size of granted loans and L/Cs. Using 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance data, we show that commercial banking in concentrated banking markets...