Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitation when patent protection is strong and imitation cost is low. Within the area of credible imitation, the innovator has an incentive to postpone technology adoption when the cost of imitation is relatively high. The...

This paper examines how the option for licensing affects research and development (R&D) and social welfare.We find that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and there is an option of licensing, firms will do non-cooperative R&D. In absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D...

This paper investigates the effect of different patent regimes on R&D investment and social welfare in a duopoly market with uncertain R&D process. We find that strong patent protection increases R&D investment of at least one firm but whether both firms? R&D investment will be more under strong...

We use a duopoly to show how the possibility of licensing ex post R&D affects the decision on R&D organization. We show that whether licensing ex post R&D affects the incentive for doing cooperative R&D depends on the nature of cooperative R&D. If the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid...

We consider the possibility of forming a joint venture (JV) between a local firm and a foreign multinational in a situation when there is no current gain from such an arrangement. In the presence of policy uncertainty and threat of entry, a current period formation of JV with the multinational,...

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can...

Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately. In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare.We show that the effect of licensing on the incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs of doing R&D. We also show that...

In a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the...

In this paper we show how the size of innovation can affect the incentive for cooperative R&D and social welfare. When cost difference between large and small innovations is not sufficiently large then social welfare can be more under small innovation compared to large innovation. However, the...

In an oligopoly industry of k firms (k 2) with linear demand and identical (constant) average cost of production, a bilateral merger is never profitable when all firms choose their quantities simultaneously. In this paper we reexamine the issue when some firms have first-mover advantage. We...