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In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is $U(I,a)=-e^{-k(I-a)}$, then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596812
We study a two periods model of incomplete markets with nominal assets unsecured by collateral, where agents can go bankrupt but there are no bankruptcy penalties entering directly in the utility function. We address two cases: first, a proportional reimbursement rule under bounded short sales...
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Can any prominent theory of decision under risk rationalize both small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion? Do some prominent theories fail to rationalize patterns of same-stakes risk aversion? How do reference payoffs enter in the answer to these questions? What would be the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698239
Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers a constant to an uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose expected utility (EU) version is Arrow and Pratt’s more risk aversion concept, will be studied in the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model. Necessary condition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993579
Following Aumann and Serrano (J Polit Econ 116:810–836, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2008</CitationRef>) who characterize by axioms an index of riskiness defined on absolute returns, we characterize a new index of riskiness defined on relative returns. Both indices are characterized by a similar principle of duality between risk and...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993588
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock contests with logistic contest success functions, when contestants are risk averse. We prove that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists, but give an example of a symmetric contest with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593369
Uncertainty has an almost negligible impact on project value in the standard economic model. I show that a comprehensive evaluation of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude changes this picture fundamentally. The illustration of this result relies on the discount rate, which is the crucial...
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