We use the tools of mechanism design, combined with the theory of risk measures, to analyze a model where a cash constrained owner of an asset with stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors that di¤er in their risk aversion and budget constraints. The distribution of the...

We show that benchmark-linked convex incentives can lead risk-averse money managers aware of mispricing to over-invest in overpriced securities. In the model, the managers' risk-seeking behavior varies in response to the interaction of mispricing with convexity and benchmarking concerns....

We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may...

This paper explores the relationship between the self-declared risk aversion of private investors and their propensity to hold incomplete portfolios of financial assets. The analysis is based on household survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) that provides a reliable measure of...

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing payoff uncertainty for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is common knowledge, except that bidders have private...