This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordi- nary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations...

The aim of this paper is to highlight empirically some important worldwide differences in the impact of privatization of the fixed-line telecommunications operator on network expansion, tariffs, and efficiency during the 1985-2007 period for a large panel of countries. Our work suggests that the...

The main goal of this study is to demonstrate the existence of a significant empirical link between infrastructure and financial sectors reforms the effects of which are reflected in infrastructure sectors performance. This paper reports on the findings of an exploration of this issue for the...

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it...

This paper develops a simple model in which a regulated (upstream) transporter provides capacity to a marketer competing in output with an incumbent in the (downstream) gas commodity market. The equilibrium outcome of the firms' interaction in the downstream market is explicitly taken into...

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis....

Motivated by the higher price sensitivity and service homogenisation in the airline industry in recent years, we propose a new methodology to deal with transaction prices and to estimate the effect of alliances in the US domestic market. The assumption that airlines compete on price allows us to...

We study the political economy of urban traffic policy. We consider a city and its suburbs. The city decides, by majority voting, on a parking charge in the Central Business District (CBD) and restrictions on road space dedicated to cars. City and suburbs vote on road pricing in the CBD. Results...