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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010

group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under … fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget …-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673

Social Choice: Recent Developments

BOSSERT, Walter; WEYMARK, J.A. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2006

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353335

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

SPRUMONT, Yves; MANIQUET, François - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2006

partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353508

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2009

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671578

Measuring Economic Insecurity

BOSSERT, Walter; D’AMBROSIO, Conchita - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2009

We provide a systematic treatment of the notion of economic insecurity, assuming that an individual’s sentiment of insecurity depends on the current wealth level and its variations experienced in the past. We think of wealth as a comprehensive variable encompassing anything that may help in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679131

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

SPRUMONT, Yves - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2009

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679138

Multidimensional Poverty and Material Deprivation

BOSSERT, Walter; CHAKRAVARTY, Satya R.; D’AMBROSIO, … - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2009

We examine the measurement of multidimensional poverty and material deprivation following the counting approach. In contrast to earlier contributions, dimensions of well-being are not forced to be equally important but different weights can be assigned to different dimensions. We characterize a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679141

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

SPRUMONT, Yves - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010

We offer an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679145

House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186232

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186242