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Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861426
Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708506
This article considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption, and culture in setting fund manager fees. With better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708367
This paper considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees in terms of their fixed management fees, carried interest performance fees, clawbacks of fees and cash versus share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708368
We analyze how the law and its enforcement affect equity market equilibrium. Improvements in the legal system, while invariably associated with broader equity markets, have different effects on equity returns depending on the institutional change considered and on the degree of international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839176
This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839186
We analyze corporate fraud in a model where managers have superior information but, due to private benefits from empire building, are biased against liquidation. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To restrain fraud,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839199
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