Whether bilateral trade barrier data conform with the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model’s predictions about “trade talks” is examined in this article. A simple form of the prediction from the model is tested. Bilateral US-Japan and US-EU data from the 1990s are employed. The results are the...

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical...

Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and...

In order to explain the prevalence and persistence of trade protection, a large body of work that departs from the notion of welfare maximizing governments and emphasizes instead political-economic determinants of policy has recently emerged. This survey paper summarizes and evaluates...