In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close...

The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the...

We study a non-cooperative model of unilateral network formation. Derks et al. [2008b] prove the existence of local-Nash and global-Nash networks for games with payoff functions that satisfy a framework of axiomatic properties. These properties are inspired by the one-way flow model, which is...

In a strategic coalitional game, we consider the relations among four cores α, β, γ, and the one we call δ which is obtained by slightly weakening the conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that the α-core and the γ-core are refined by the δ-core; and,...

This article studies how a mechanism designer can influence games by promising payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies. First, we investigate the cost of implementing a desirable behavior and present algorithms to compute this cost. Whereas a mechanism designer can...

In many instances of price discrimination, a seller of an item is in possession of signals from competing buyers regarding their private valuation for the item. If the seller uses this information to price discriminate against the buyer, buyers would correspondingly modify their signalling...

No abstract received.

In this note we present an example of a TU game where both the value presented by Aumann and Drèze (1974) and the value introduced by Wiese (2007) do not exhibit a stable coalition structure.

Von Neumann proved the minimax theorem (existence of a saddle-point solution to 2 person, zero sum games) in 1928. While his second article on the minimax theorem, stating the proof, has long been translated from German, his first announcement of his result (communicated in French to the Academy...

We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game...