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Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers

Baldwin, Richard; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies some of the many options facing EU leaders when choosing a viable voting system for the EU25+. It provides quantitative estimates of the efficiency and power distributions of the various EU voting schemes that are being considered. It also provides intuition on how various...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788902

The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136464

The Competitiveness of Hungarian Industry

Hare, Paul G; Hughes, Gordon; Michael, Thomas; Revesz, Tamas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

Using an RAS update to 1990 of an 86-sector input-output table for Hungary in 1986, and corresponding data on world-to-domestic price ratios for 1990, this paper calculates domestic resource costs (DRCs) for Hungarian industries. The disaggregated results are compared with corresponding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662220

Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China

Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing … accountability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001062

Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence

Bracco, Emanuele; Lockwood, Ben; Porcelli, Francesco; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165654

The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How has it changed?

Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The roles of central banks in the advanced economies have expanded and multiplied since the beginning of the crisis. The conventional monetary policy roles - setting interest rates in the pursuit of macroeconomic stability and acting as lender of last resort and market maker of last resort to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083725

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if … flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond … that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084114

Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?

Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Central banks’ economic and political importance has grown in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. An unwillingness or inability of governments to use countercyclical fiscal policy has made monetary policy the only stabilization tool in town. However, much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084413

Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

. Centralization allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability, which can be precisely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792514

Rational Crowd-Pleasing and Democratic Accountability

Dewatripont, Mathias; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

wasteful projects are often attributed to weak mechanisms of accountability, such as inadequate opportunities for voters to … wasteful spending may be a by-product of the accountability of politicians to their voters, not a symptom of its weakness or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468681