Showing 1 - 10 of 32
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264227
This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264287
The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292501
How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the … connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265982
accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with … decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274383
This paper provides a simple model to explain effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on policy choices and election outcomes. We derive precise predictions that, as long as voters attribute most of the credit for providing public goods to the local government: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291559
This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292696
Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328842
these politicians are not subject to reelection restrictions. This weakened accountability can be counterbalanced by an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277360
This paper reconsiders the division of the literature on electoral competition into models with forward-looking voters and those with backward-looking voters by combining ideas from both strands of the literature. As long as there is no uncertainty about voters' policy preferences and parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281796