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Entrepreneurial Orientation In Management Buy-Outs And The Contribution Of Venture Capital

wright, mike; Bruining, Bruining, J. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2002

This paper focuses on the development of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) after a management buy-out (MBO) and on the role played by venture capital firms in enhancing EO. It presents results of two exploratory case studies of divisional buy-outs with regard to their EO and the areas where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011242173

The Economics of Sorruption and Cronyism: an institutional approach

Hendrischke, Hans; Krug, Krug, B. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2001

Moral outrage was the response of the Chinese press, when Cheng Kejie, one of the country's highest officials, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and former Governor of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, was arrested on grounds of corruption on 25...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730979

Core and Common Members in Chinese Farmer Cooperatives

Liang, Liang, Q.X.; Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J.; … - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2012

indicate that the life cycle and the governance characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China differ from cooperatives in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730986

Chain Interdependencies, Measurement Problems, and Efficient Governance Structure: Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

Feng, Feng, L.; Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2011

cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731031

Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China

Hu, Hu, Y.; Huang, Huang, Z.; Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2005

Zhejiang province, and the various attributes (governance, quality control system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in … physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in the current institutional setting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731074

Learning And Governance In Inter-Firm Relations

Nooteboom, Bart - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2004

This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It … relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731384

Trust and Formal Control in interorganizational Relationships

Nooteboom, Bart; Klein Woolthuis, R. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2002

There is a tendency to see trust and control by formal agreements as substitutes. According to transaction cost economics trust is unreliable, and some form of control is needed to reduce hazards of opportunism. According to others, high trust allows for a limited extent of formal control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731433

On the Nature of a Cooperative: A System of Attributes Perspective

Feng, Feng, L.; Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2007

enterprise as a system of attributes and the delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731474

An Incomplete Contracting Model of Governance Structure Variety in Franchising

Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J.; Jiang, Jiang, T. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2007

For the purpose of explaining governance structure variety in franchising, we explore the impact of governance … governance structure uniquely allocates efficient ownership over assets. Whether dual distribution benefits are realized in a … dual distribution governance structure is a positive systemic effect, not the value of the brand name or location (or other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731525

Cooperative CEO Identity and Efficient Governance: Member or Outside CEO?

Liang, Liang, Q.X.; Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J. - Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), … - 2012

A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with a member CEO and cooperatives with an employed outsider as CEO. Results of the model show that the incentive strength regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to that of the outside CEO in order to shift...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010837536