In this paper we compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator. Then, the incumbent firm can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult....

This paper presents a game where the incumbent firm uses the price as a signal about demand size. Without observing the demand, the regulator has to decide if the entry of new firms will be allowed. The game has a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the incumbent firm chooses the...

We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal dierentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with dierent consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the...

This article focuses on the location decision of firms when competing in a spatial Cournot duopoly. Our original contribution is that firms are dependent on a natural resource input, which is assumed to be located in one of the extremes of the market, to be able to produce the output sought by...

In a two-sided market duopoly, we investigate the effects of delegating long run restrictive and unrestrictive decisions to managers by the platforms' owners, the effects of the platforms' ownership establishing long run decisions without managers and the impacts of asymmetric regimes between...

We develop a duopoly price competition model that establishes a link between the recent literature of two-sided markets and behavior economics. We fully characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the level of …xed costs. Moreover, introducing discrimination between the...

We study competition between two shopping centers (department stores or shopping malls) located at the extremes of a linear city. In contrast with the existing literature, we do not restrict consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. We obtain this condition as an equilibrium...

We study a duopoly with differentiated and substitutable goods composed of one consumer-friendly firm and one pure-profit maximizing firm. In such a duopoly, a regulatory authority intervenes to control the degree of altruism of the consumer-friendly firm. We conclude that under quantity...

We consider a duopoly with horizontally differentiated firms, where firms decide the long-term plans (locations) in addition to short-term issues (prices). As in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2014), we introduce a third entity in the city by considering the presence of a policymaker that...

This paper builds on a duopoly with horizontally differentiated firms, where firms simultaneously decide the long-term plan (location) in addition to the short-term issue (price). As in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2014), we introduce a third entity in the city by considering the presence of...