Showing 1 - 10 of 43,752
are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266677
are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281267
are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190823
Experiments suggest that communication increases the contribution to public goods (Ledyard, 1995). There is also evidence that, when contemplating a lie, people trade off their private benefit from the lie with the harm it inflicts on others (Gneezy, 2005). We develop a model of bilateral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252194
We study how group size affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n less than or equal to M are randomly and anonymously matched from a fixed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010614865
strategiccomplements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts andin that of informal mutual promises. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866436
promises. -- Partnerships ; contracts ; pre-play communication ; legal enforcement ; social norms ; guilt … are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798345
promises. -- partnerships ; contracts ; pre-play communication ; legal enforcement ; social norms ; guilt … are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003785043
asymmetric information. I show that the `shame' of accepting a possible bribe can screen for reciprocation inducing `guilt'. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109577
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730990