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This paper aims to study the impact of costly and private information acquisition in global games with applications in financial crisis (e.g. bank runs, currency crisis). While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165443
Under asymmetric information, dishonest sellers lead to market unraveling in the lemons model. An additional cost of dishonesty is that language becomes cheap talk. We develop instead a model where people derive utility from actions (what they say), as well as from outcomes, so talk is costly....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102884
Empirical and experimental findings suggest that players may underestimate others' private information in incomplete-information games. We modify standard epistemic assumptions of static incomplete-information games to allow partial signal-awareness. That is, players can be unaware of some of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037266
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With … degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating … configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355251
We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224476
based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062048
Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). This note identifies an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provides a variant that preserves some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062638
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with a variant where the signal-generating mechanism is subject to … separating and has intuitive comparative-static properties in that the degree of signaling is a function of the prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046412
In this paper we face the fitting versus forecasting paradox with the objective of realizing an optimal Early Warning System to better describe and predict past and future sovereign defaults. We do this by proposing a new Regression Tree-based model that signals a potential crisis whenever...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117928
commitment to peg is strengthened. That the insurance scheme serves as a commitment device renders it an ineffective signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291933