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This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266286
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252343
This paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities while investors are coordinating on a speculative attack. The authorities want to achieve specific targets for output and inflation but also to avoid a regime change (i.e. sovereign default). They use the traditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099682
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With … degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating … configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307240
noisy signaling by an informed policy-maker and shows that in this game, equilibrium beliefs depart in quite stark ways from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903404
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With … degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating … configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368116
Leaders and historians see prestige as important, but international relations theorists have neglected the concept, in part for lack of a clear definition. It is proposed that a party "holds prestige" when group members generally believe that the party has a certain desirable quality, and this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762500
' later signaling their private information to rivals. Due to signaling, equilibrium prices are distorted, and so while firms …, compared with firms that do not attempt to manipulate rivals' beliefs, signaling firms acquire less precise information. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548620
studying (the pure human capital model) or whether studying has no effect on productivity (the pure signaling model). Thus … help to distinguish between human capital and signaling. However, with longitudinal data, RDD can be used to estimate the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758735
A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261645