This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate dividend policy on the capital structure in the Korean stock market. To distinctly discern the voluntariness of changes in corporate dividend policy, we analyze companies that, following a substantial increase, do not reduce dividends for...

We examine which methods are appropriate for estimating dynamic panel data models in empirical corporate finance. Our simulations show that the instrumental variable and GMM estimators are unreliable, and sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, residual serial correlation, and...

God gave Moses the Decalogue (The Ten Commandments) in the Sinai or Horep (Exodus 20:1-17; Leviticus 19; Deuteronomy 5:6-21) and salvation to all before Jesus. Jesus summarized the Decalogue into two (Matthew 21:34-40, Mark 12:28-31 and Luke 10:25-37). St. Augustine of Hippo based on the Decalogue...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on executive incentive schemes. We argue that excessive risk-taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than non-publicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence...

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive' risk....

I examine how the debt covenant structure of a firm varies with managerial risk-taking incentives via CEO compensation sensitivities to stock return volatility (Vega). I build a comprehensive firm debt covenant index by including both public and private debt issues. I find a robust negative...