It is widely believed that the English auction is solved after the dominated strategies are eliminated. This opinion is formally confirmed only for one "ascending clock" auction and can not be generalized for most other English auctions. In this paper I show that the formal argument which is...

Experimental results on the Ellsberg paradox typically reveal behavior that is commonly interpreted as ambiguity aversion. The experiments reported in the current paper find the objective probabilities for drawing a red ball that make subjects indifferent between various risky and uncertain...

New theoretical foundations for analyzing the newsboy problem under incomplete information about the probability distribution of random demand are presented. Firstly, we reveal that the distribution-free newsboy problem under the worst-case and best-case demand scenarios actually reduces to the...

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our...

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our...

A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from economic experiments. We test the relative performance of some of these models using an experimental design that is aimed at capturing pure distributional concerns in a multi-person setting. We find...

The eductive approach consists of finding solutions consistent with common knowledge of individual rationality and the model. An equilibrium is stable whenever it is the unique outcome consistent with these assumptions. This is a strong stability criterion as it relies on no assumption of prior...

We analyze indirect evolutionary two-player games to identify the dynamic emergence of (strong) reciprocity in a large number of economic settings. The underlying evolutionary environment allows for an arbitrary initial population state provided that every degree of the compact space of...