This paper estimates depth of reasoning in an Iterative Best Response model using data from Weber (<CitationRef CitationID="CR20">2003</CitationRef>) ten-period repeated guessing game with no feedback. Different mixture models are estimated and the type (Level-0, Level-1, etc) of each player is determined in every round using the...</citationref>

We study beliefs and actions in a repeated normal-form game. Using a level-k model of limited strategic reasoning and allowing for other-regarding preferences, we classify action and belief choices with regard to their strategic sophistication and study their development over time. In addition...

Coordination problems are ubiquitous in social and economic life. Political mass demonstrations, the decision whether to join a speculative currency attack, investment in a risky venture, and capital flight from a particular country are all characterized by coordination problems. Furthermore,...

Herding describes the phenomenon in decision-making where an economic agent disregards his own private information to follow the actions of his predecessors as in Banerjee (1992). With later decision-makers simply copying earlier decisions their private information cannot be inferred by other...