When environmental externalities are international — i.e. transfrontier — they most often are multilateral and embody public good characteristics. Improving upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria requires voluntary cooperation for which the game-theoretic core concept provides optimal...

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...

We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner's viewpoint. We show that the dynamical inefficiency of competitive...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of average efficiency of depollution technology. If on the contrary, the...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. Each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can voluntarily contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution...

This paper deals with the effect of conjectures in a strategic setting.To do this it focuses on the so-called Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE).According to this concept, each agent chooses his most favorable action taking into account that rival strategies are a conjectured function of...