Showing 1 - 10 of 94
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149759
Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512517
This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009274266
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influ- ence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695878
Understanding how observers attribute intentionality to people in the focus of their attention helps in shedding light on punishment behavior. In this paper we approach impartial observers' attributions of intentionality and the attachment of praise and blame to perpetrators of external effects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511323
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008863956
, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are … fairness approach and compare it with that of optimal, e.g. welfaristic game theoretic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631674
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884452
Talent allocation models assume that entrepreneurial talent is selfish and thus allocates into unproductive or even destructive activities if these offer the highest private returns. This paper experimentally analyzes other-regarding preferences of entrepreneurial talent. We find that making a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964129
Software ist ein Gut, welches besondere ökonomische Eigenschaften aufweist. In diesem Artikel werden - ausgehend von einer allgemeinen Definition des Gutes Software - systematisch zentrale ökonomische Eigenschaften herausgearbeitet, welche Implikationen für die Produktion und Kostenstruktur,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786021