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Chaigneau, Pierre - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2012

This paper extends a standard principal-agent model of CEO compensation by modeling the progressive attenuation of information asymmetries between firm insiders and shareholders in continuous time. In this setting, we show that the optimal timing of compensation results from a tradeoff between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010615166

Measuring Ratchet Effects within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment varying Contractual Commitment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2014

We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775426

Bankers' compensation: Sprint swimming in short bonus pools?

Jokivuolle, Esa; Keppo, Jussi - Suomen Pankki - 2014

The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 has given rise to new regulatory initiatives to put restrictions on the size and the term of bankers' pay. We revisit both theoretically and empirically the question of whether these regulations are justified. We model bonuses as a series of sequential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734434

On the Relevance and Composition of Gifts within the Firm: Evidence from Field Experiments

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2009

We investigate the economic relevance and the composition of gifts within a firm where output is contractible. We develop a structural econometric model that identifies workers’ optimal reaction to monetary gifts received from their employer. We estimate the model using data from two separate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528566

How do family ties, boards and regulation affect pay at the top? Evidence for Indian CEOs

Fagernäs, Sonja - ESRC Centre for Business Research - 2006

performance and both CEO and firm specific fixed effects. The hypothesis is that corporate governance, ownership structures and … component and the performance-related component of pay. In contrast, the presence of outside representatives on the board - non … lowers the level of pay and that of non-executives ties pay more to firm performance. A further timely finding is that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162824

Gift Exchange within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2007

We present results from a field experiment testing the gift-exchange hypothesis inside a tree-planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts. Firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attribuable to past planting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015243

The Effect of Adversity on Process Innovations and Managerial Incentives

Dostie, Benoit; Jayaraman, Rajshri - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2009

This paper asks whether adversity spurs the introduction of process innovations and increases the use of managerial incentives by firms. Using a large panel data set of workplaces in Canada, our identification strategy relies on exogenous variation in adversity arising from increased border...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015310

Determinants of the use of financial incentives in investment banking

Nash, David - ESRC Centre for Business Research - 2003

This paper examines the use of incentive pay schemes within the financial services sector in London. Various theories of wage determination are reviewed with particular attention placed on the principal-agent literature as a framework for analysing the use of incentive pay. This is combined with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005688017

Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2006

The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has been explained in two ways: the presence of transaction costs as determinants of contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity incentive contracts. The empirical importance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670281

Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking

Jokivuolle, Esa; Keppo, Jussi; Yuan, Xuchuan - Suomen Pankki - 2015

We model a banker's future bonuses as a series of call options on the bank's profits and show that bonus caps and deferrals reduce risk-taking. However, the banker's optimal risk-taking also depends on the costs of risk-taking. We calibrate the model to US banking data and show that lengthening...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207862

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