Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive...

Bank payouts divert cash to shareholders, while leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets to repay debt holders in the future. Bank payouts, therefore, constitute a type of risk-shifting that benefits equity holders at the expense of debt holders. In this paper, we provide insights on how...

Using a sample of 2198 completed M&A transactions between 1994 and 2010 in which both target and acquirer are public US firms supplemented with hand-collected data for target CEO retention, we uncover a significantly negative relation between target CEO retention and takeover premiums received...

This paper studies the impact of diversification on firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Prior research suggests that diversification affects both the probability and costs of distress. Treating bankruptcy as a special case of distress, we find that diversification reduces the likelihood...

We investigate the relative importance of various bankruptcy predictors commonly used in the existing literature by applying a variable selection technique, the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), to a comprehensive bankruptcy database. Over the 1980–2009 period, LASSO...