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Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60. Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255890

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(4), 676-686. We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123

Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?

Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert; Bossche, Seth Van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This discussion paper has led to a publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, 83(3), 279-291. We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256208

Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment

Bradler, Christiane; Dur, Robert; Neckermann, Susanne; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task … recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the … best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256211

How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256397

Rent-seeking versus Productive Activities in a Multi-task Experiment

Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292110000978">'European Economic Review'</A>, 55(5), 630-43.Incentive instruments like asset ownership and performance pay often …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256678

The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance … historically have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more noisy performance. Publication is forthcoming in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256723

Social Relations, Incentives, and Gender in the Workplace

Onemu, Okemena - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

Gender differences in preferences regarding social relationships and competitive environments are well documented in psychology and economics. Research also shows that social relationships and competition among co-workers are affected by the incentive schemes workers are exposed to. We combine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256739

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257176

The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives: An Experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611000571">'Games and Economic Behavior'</A>, 73(2), 573-94.We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in...</a>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257241