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important primitives of social capital - trust and reciprocity - which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of … questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects' behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013325085
that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in … an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011413150
The intention to “invest” in the Trust Game in extensive form revealed by a move could conceal different motivations … embedded in the trust game: 1) an “investment” motive - conditional cooperation is a way to express the expectation of … measures of trust and trustworthiness. In this paper, we will then be using the “words” of answers to a questionnaire in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766550
important primitives of social capital – trust and reciprocity – which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of … questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects’ behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700904
that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in … an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410034
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089179
designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor’s action space in two versions of the “trust game … investment but limit investors’ demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all-in” investors are less generously …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013234417
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845178
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866876
For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011480420