Since they have been increasingly used in economics, elicitation rules for subjective beliefs are under scrutiny. In this paper, we propose an experimental design to compare the performance of such rules. Contrary to previous works in which elicited beliefs are compared to an objective...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

We study the testability implications of public versus private consumption. The distinguishing feature of our approach is that we start from a revealed preference characterization of collectively rational behavior. Remarkably, we find that assumptions regarding the public or private nature of...

In an often quoted article, Genesove and Mayer (2001) observe that house sellers are reluctant to sell at a loss, and attribute this finding to loss aversion. I show that loss aversion cannot explain this phenomenon

This paper examines the intrahousehold ressource allocation in Egyptian married couples and its impact on females labor supply. Using data from the Egyptian Labor market and Panel Survey of 2006, we estimate a discrete-choice model for female labor supply within a collective framework. The...

I show that a loss averse consumer who must share her budget between two goods prefer allocations for which consumption equals reference point for at least one good. The phenomenon intensity depends on the curvature of the utility curve. These results are consistent with several stylized facts...

This paper proposes a new formulation of the theory of social norms. The theoretical model explores the interrelation between individuals' income, time-use and consumption decisions on the one hand, and the determinants of their decision to conform or not to social norms on the other. It is...

Static competitive equilibria in economies with incomplete markets are generically constrained suboptimal. Allocations induced by strategic equilibria of imperfectly competitive markets are also generically inefficient. In both cases, there is scope for Pareto-improving amendments. In an...