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The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses

Bosch-Rosa, Ciril; Meissner, Thomas - In: Experimental Economics 23 (2020) 4, pp. 1129-1147

Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504346

Obviousness around the clock

Breitmoser, Yves; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian - In: Experimental Economics 25 (2021) 2, pp. 483-513

Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391

The impact of stress on tournament entry

Buser, Thomas; Dreber, Anna; Mollerstrom, Johanna - In: Experimental Economics 20 (2017) 2, pp. 506-530

, many people experience competitive contexts as stressful. We use two laboratory experiments to investigate whether factors … related to stress can help explain individual differences in tournament entry. Experiment 1 studies whether stress responses … for men but is positively and significantly correlated with choosing to enter the tournament for women. In Experiment 2 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030251

The cost of a divided America: an experimental study into destructive behavior

Mill, Wladislaw; Morgan, John - In: Experimental Economics 25 (2021) 3, pp. 974-1001

Does political polarization lead to dysfunctional behavior? To study this question, we investigate the attitudes of supporters of Donald Trump and of Hillary Clinton towards each other and how these attitudes affect spiteful behavior. We find that both Trump and Clinton supporters display less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501447

Closing a mental account: the realization effect for gains and losses

Merkle, Christoph; Müller-Dethard, Jan; Weber, Martin - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2020) 1, pp. 303-329

How do risk attitudes change after experiencing gains or losses? For the case of losses, Imas (Am Econ Rev 106:2086–2109, 2016) shows that subsequent risk-taking behavior depends on whether these losses have been realized or not. After a realized loss, individuals’ risk-taking decreases,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504105

Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2021) 2, pp. 434-488

The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012627987

The dark side of friendship: ‘envy’

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 4, pp. 547-570

This paper studies the effect of social relations on convergence to the efficient equilibrium in 2×2 coordination games from an experimental perspective. We employ a 2×2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols: “friends”...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988965

Circadian effects on strategic reasoning

Dickinson, David; McElroy, Todd - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 3, pp. 444-459

The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988967

Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure distributional preferences

Jakiela, Pamela - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 2, pp. 208-221

We conduct modified dictator games in which price of giving varies across choice situations, and examine responses to price changes in two contexts—one where dictators divide their own earnings, and another where they divide the earnings of others. Varying the price of giving allows us to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988973

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter; … - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303

describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if … second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988977

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