During the last 50 years with unprecedented population growth and urbanization, economic development, particularly in developing countries failed to generate adequate employment and income opportunities in the modern sector, compelling the surplus labour force to generate its own means of...

This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage....

We develop a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets which highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a...

A three-sector, three-factor general equilibrium model is developed for a small open developing economy where an inflow of foreign capital generates externalities in the presence of a non-traded final commodity. There are two types of capital and the efficiency of labour depends positively on...

The paper shows that the policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets is distinctly superior to the existing credit policy of horizontally substituting the informal sector by the formal one. An inflow of subsidized formal credit to the informal lenders not...

This paper explains the existence of intersectoral wage differential in a developing economy in terms of trade union behavior in the formal sector industry and analyzes its role in predicting the outcomes of trade and investment reforms on welfare. It provides theoretical explanations of certain...