taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …

taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …

taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …

show that the increase in efficiency holds even when controlling for the search intensity of guests, the change in the … composition of transactions and aggregate market conditions at the time of search I demonstrate that guests are elastic with … reduction in required transaction costs: learning, reputation building and platform policy. I show that all three are likely …

(2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search …I develop a dynamic version of the competitive search model with adverse selection in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright … frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation …

observing prices. In a noisy learning environment, price discrimination can be detrimental to the firm and beneficial to the …

-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the … payoff. When the environment is not resistent to learning, the patient long-run player can secure his commitment payoff in …