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what requiresa unique fairness benchmark. More often than not there exist, however,multiple standards. In our view, this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866826
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870886
In generosity games, one agreement payo is exogenously given,whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the"pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiencyor equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248901
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games such as the prisoners' dilemma. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving. In the one-sided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867006
In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permitwith the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given.Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one hasadditional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. We speakof greasing when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867100
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003423316
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952438
In a situation, where it is efficient for one of two parties to pollute but highly inefficient if both parties do so, the harmed third party can freely impose its damage claims on both parties what crucially determines which equilibrium to expect. Whereas "equality before the law" requires equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313097
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751380
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345258