Corporate boards are responsible for ensuring that managers enact policies that are in shareholders' best interests, and managers are responsible for implementing strategies that are not only profitable, but responsive to changing legal and societal demands and the resource needs of the firm. In...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the U.S. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger...

Exploiting a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on state legislations, we investigate how corporate carbon reduction efforts are influenced by the takeover market, which is widely regarded as a crucial instrument of external corporate governance. Our results show that...

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We employ broad-based governance measures that encompass multiple factors, including boards, audit quality, charter/bylaws, director quality, executive compensation,...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm’s overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher...