This paper uses granular data on syndicated loans to analyse the impact of international reforms for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on bank lending behaviour. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find no effect of the reforms on overall credit supply, while at...

This paper develops a bank model for financial systemic risk in bank lending. The model analyzes the impact of a financial institution failure on the distribution of losses in the financial system. The fundamental idea is that bank loss rates may be decomposed into a level, momentum, systematic...

The main goal of the study is to research the role of the credit reporting system in minimizing credit risks in the sector by acting as an information agent in the economy and to analyze critical factors for introduction of private credit bureaus in the Azerbaijani economy. To that end, the...

This paper studies the welfare effects of different credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, a deviation from the Friedman rule is always sub-optimal. Moreover, credit arrangements can be welfare-reducing, because increased...

This paper develops an adverse selection model which uncovers two mechanisms whereby Grameen-style peer grouping systems can trigger lower interest rates. In one extreme scenario, where participant borrowers do not have prior information about the type of their peers, lower interest rate are...

By employing a sample of 20,956 observations of non-financial SMEs headquartered in the Euro area, between 2009 and 2015, we test whether young businesses are more likely to face credit rejections from lenders than their older peers. Our findings appear to confirm our suspicions that new...

This paper extends Ghatak (1999)'s base model of group lending with asymmetric information by allowing individuals to differ both in their exogenous risk type and in their endogenous effort level. We find that joint liability leads to positive assortative matching in both a non-cooperative and a...

Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex-ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and...