Showing 1 - 10 of 111,604
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985854
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284043
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568315
In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984 … cooperative motives. In contrast to Green and Porter (1984), our results show that in a model with learning, breakdown of a cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113984
A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977350
We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the revenue maximizing mechanism, each bidder makes a payment that is independent of his signal and the allocation discriminates in favor of bidders with lower signals. We provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977351
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704
We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875