Similar Search Results

Long-run effects of the Spanish Inquisition

Vidal-Robert, Jordi - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

to levels of trust or social polarization, I find it is negatively associated with the adoption of new technologies and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862686

Habemus Papam? Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States

Pino, Francisco J.; Vidal-Robert, Jordi - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

, and construct measures of polarization and fractionalization based on the cardinals’ places of birth. The deaths of popes … standard deviation in our measure of polarization raised the likelihood of internal conflict by between 2 and 3 percent in a …We study the effect of divisions within the elite on the probability of internal conflict in the Papal States between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862701

Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule

Hughes, Niall E - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

Conventional models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen - extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when when single district elections are used to fill a legislature we get back to a world where the median voter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144206

Reciprocity towards Groups

Hugh Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2011

People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against a person who harmed them, but against another person in that person's group. We tested for group reciprocity in laboratory experiments. Subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with partners from different groups. They then allocated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862687

Why Go to Court? Bargaining Failure under the Shadow of Trial with Complete Information

McBride, Michael; Skaperdas, Stergios; Tsai, Pi-Han - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2014

Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959987

Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2006

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619

Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2008

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368658

Trade and Insecure Resources

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2011

We construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources … comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351407

Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; McBride, Michael; Skaperdas, … - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2011

static contest model, in which two sides choose levels of arming and whether to engage in actual conflict or settle in the … shadow of conflict. We show how arming critically depends on both governance and norms, and therefore how societies with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391818

The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction

Harrison, Mark - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2013

This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and … conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of … coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758408