such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status …, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of …

The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame … the benefit of revenge reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asymmetric is the conflict. The authors …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party's intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple model of conflict which is driven by …History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status …, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status …, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of …