Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of risk averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor performance,...

This paper investigates the consequences of imperfect and uneven factor market development for farm efficiency in rural China during transition. In particular, we estimate the extent to which an inverse relationship in farm productivity can be attributed to the administrative (instead of market)...

This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Introducing concerns about land fertility for the landlords in a Principal-Agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard, the authors show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade-off between production and land quality maintenance. Using Philippines data, a model...

Ever since Adam Smith, share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives. Sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue. The empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are less...

We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...

The paper investigates a model where two parties sequentially invest in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the project value are unverifiable, and A is wealth constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either agent B or an external investor C, say a bank. We show that an...