I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not...

We analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller. Potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. The seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game, which is...

Much has been written over the years about longer emergency medical services (EMS) response times in rural areas as opposed to urban areas. Yet within urban areas, outside of case studies of certain cities, not much has been written about longer EMS response times in newer, fringe suburban or...

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...

This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travelers. Travelers are otherwise identical and other travelers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast...