This paper extends the recent literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far. At...

Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact of such inefficient household decisions on market performance is investigated. At one extreme, market efficiency can occur even when household decisions are inefficient, namely when household...

We provide an axiomatic framework for exchange markets with a willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept discrepancy. First, we obtain a two parameter family of market invariants under price-scaling representing the excess demand. One of the parameters can be identified as endowment. The other is...

Uniqueness of equilibrium is a relatively unexplored issue in incomplete markets compared with complete markets. This work shows that one-fund separation is sufficient for the uniqueness of equilibrium in a special class of incomplete markets with two agents and two assets. Specifically, it...

This paper studies Markov Equilibria (ME) corresponding to recursive equilibria on natural state space in the stochastic OLG model extended to include non-additive utility, nonclassical production, and Markovian production shocks. Specifically, we provide sufficient conditions under which the ME...

The paper presents and studies a new concept of coalition domination for incomplete markets. It was elaborated applying a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core allocations are implemented by the net trades (webs of...

We propose a nonparametric approach to multiple calibration of numerical general equilibrium models, where counterfactual equilibria are solutions to the Walrasian inequalities. We present efficient approximation schemes for deciding the solvability of Walrasian inequalities

We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian...