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Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision
Fehr, Ernst; Ederer, Florian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822257
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madies, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
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Deception and incentives: how dishonesty undermines effort provision
Ederer, Florian; Fehr, Ernst - 2007
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268559
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Equality Concerns and the Limits of Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Populations
Gangadharan, Lata; Nikiforakis, Nikos; Villeval, Marie … - 2015
Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Agents' concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401649
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Quitting and Peer Effects at Work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313
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Quitting and peer effects at work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282125
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513229