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Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision

Fehr, Ernst; Ederer, Florian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822257

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Bjedov, Tjaša; Madies, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041

Role Selection and Team Performance

Cooper, David J.; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Team success relies on assigning team members to the right tasks. We use controlled experiments to study how roles are assigned within teams and how this affects team performance. Subjects play the takeover game in pairs consisting of a buyer and a seller. Understanding optimal play is very...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225777

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

We study how upward communication – from workers to managers – about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125865

The Effect of Communication Channels on Promise-Making and Promise-Keeping

Conrads, Julian; Reggiani, Tommaso - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a … helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized … cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The less anonymous (face …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959794

Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management

Guadalupe, Maria; Li, Hongyi; Wulf, Julie M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884351

The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279295

Quitting and Peer Effects at Work

Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313

Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703398