In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged...

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (schools) impose some distributional constraints (e.g., a maximum quota for a set of schools), and develop a strategyproof mechanism that can handle a very general class of distributional...

In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged...

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (hospitals) impose some distributional constraints (e.g., a minimum quota for each hospital). We show that when the preference of the hospitals is represented as an M-natural-concave...