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Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082

Belief free equilibria

Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010656001

Folk Theorems, Second Version

Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822885

Robustness of the Uniqueness of Walrasian Equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas Utilities

Cass, David; Borah, Abhinash; Kim, Kyungmin; Kryshko, Maxym - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2009

appropriate robustness result requires perturbing economies uniformly over the space of endowments for which the result is … obtained. In this paper, we examine the robustness of the uniqueness of Walrasian endowment economies with Cobb-Douglas utility … functions under this interpretation of robustness. Namely, we prove that for economies described by Cobb-Douglas utilities and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500931

On the Structure of Rationalizability for Arbitrary Spaces of Uncertainty

Penta, Antonio - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

This note characterizes the set A¡∞ of actions of player ¡ that are uniquely rationalizable for some hierarchy of beliefs on an arbitrary space of uncertainty. It is proved that for any rationalizable action a¡ for the type t¡, if a¡ belongs to A¡∞ and is justified by conjectures...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979895

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium … a uniform folk theorem with public monitoring which, combined with our robustness result, yields a new folk theorem for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109614

Confidence-Enhanced Performance

Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

There is ample evidence that emotions affect performance. Positive emotions can improve performance, while negative ones may diminish it. For example, the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences (shaking, loss of concentration) that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126710

Confidence-Enhanced Performance

Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102097