In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of the Euclidean space , we axiomatize the choice method that selects the point in S that is closet to e.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the requirement that preferences be definable ca be analyzed fruitfully in formal terms. More specifically, the paper provides an exemple of a formal investigation of the connection between a decision maker's language and the set of definable preferences.

The main result of the paper is that policy reversals are more likely floowing realization of extreme and relatively unlikely values of parameters that map policy choice into outcomes. A corollary to this result is that policy reversals occur infrequently.

We study the optimal decisions regarding production and hedging of a competitive firm under price uncertainty. The firm faces asymmetric tax and has access to futures markets.

This paper deals with repeated decision problems which are similar to the task of guessing the color outcomes of five independent spinnings of a roulette wheel, 60% of whose slots are covered in red and 40% in white, where each correct guess yields a prize of 1$.

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.