In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information....

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information....