Decision-making is becoming increasingly complex as the number of stakeholders rises,the number of decision-makers rises as well, the implications to consider are various and far-reaching,risks and uncertainties abound and the regulatory framework is growing increasingly complex.Decision-making...

This paper extends the Stahl-Rubinstein model of bilateral bargaining to incorporate many players and multidimensional issue spaces. A central feature of our framework is that in each round of negotiations, a proposer is selected randomly. Our bargaining model consists of a sequence of...

The canonical bargaining game in economics is the ultimatum game, played by tens of thousands of students around the world over the past three decades. In the ultimatum game, first studied by Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), the “proposer” proposes how to split a...

Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In <i>Mathematics and Democracy</i>, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of...