This paper investigates prices and endogenous research decision for financial assets. In rational expectations models with public information, higher order beliefs make investors to overweight the public information relative to underlying fundamentals. The extent of this mispricing is higher if...

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax)on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We analyze a financial market à la Glosten and Milgrom, in which informed and uninformed traders trade in sequence with a market...

We discuss the notion of liquidity and liquidity risk within the financial system. We distinguish between three different liquidity types, central bank liquidity, funding and market liquidity and their relevant risks. In order to understand the workings of financial system liquidity, as well as...

We consider a simple extension of the basic new-Keynesian setup in which we relax the assumption of frictionless financial markets. In our economy, asymmetric information and default risk lead banks to optimally charge a lending rate above the risk-free rate. Our contribution is threefold....

The introduction of the euro marks a milestone in the process of European financial market integration. This paper analyzes the implications of the euro for cross-border banking activities. A portfolio model is used which captures the role of banks as providers of informational and of...

In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in each situation converge...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods...

We have experimentally tested a theory of bounded rational behavior in a "lemon market". It provides an explanation for the observation that real world players successfully conclude transactions when perfect rationality predicts a market collapse. We analyzed two different market designs :...

Wir nutzen die Ergebnisse eines Experiments über Lemons-Märkte, um wirtschaftspolitische Folgerungen über die EU-Verbraucherschutzregulierung von 1999 abzuleiten. Die beiden Marktdesigns, die im Experiment getestet wurden, unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Grades, zu dem die Verbraucher das...