Showing 1 - 10 of 2,897
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378590
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312
We study the bilateral exchange of information in the context of linear quadratic games. An information structure is here represented by a non directed network, whose nodes are agents and whose links represent sharing agreements. We first study the equilibrium use of information in any given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756291
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593891
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014252165
Large, international banking groups have sought to centralise their cross-currency liquidity management: liquidity … emerging from global liquidity management depends on how these foreign exchange transactions settle. I analyse these risks in a … game of asymmetric information. The main result is that the transition from local to global liquidity management, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003884728
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270600
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299751
We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744122
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026354