We consider a simple model of the competitive screening of students by schools and colleges. Students apply to schools … which then perform costly screening procedures of the applicants to select those with high ability. Students who receive … show a channel through which students' preferences affect schools' screening decisions and outcomes: as schools increase …

outcomes. For intermediate signaling technologies, however, three types of equilibria can exist: pessimistic beliefs by firms …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling … model of grading, we show that this mechanism reduces or even avoids grade inflation. …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling … model of grading, we show that this mechanism reduces or even avoids grade inflation. …

impact on future cohorts of graduates, or, put differently, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation …. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signalling model of grading, we show that this mechanism reduces or even …